In the wake of the Paris Climate Agreement, countries may employ sectoral approaches. These allow for efficiency gains while at the same time addressing the concerns of competitiveness and carbon leakage. Applying a multi-country, multi-sector dynamic CGE model, this paper explores the role of sector emission targets for the steel sector in an international agreement, their interaction with emissions trading systems, and to which extent sector targets may address competitiveness concerns. To better reflect technological realities, the steel sector is disaggregated into its two main industries: primary fossil fuel-based steel production (BOF) and secondary scrap recycling steel production (EAF). The policy simulations suggest that sectoral targets may effectively counter the (negative) output and competitiveness effects of differences in the stringency of climate policy across countries. BOF steel contributes significantly more to emission reductions than EAF steel. Moreover, the output effects of BOF and EAF are of opposite signs.
Introduction
The Paris Agreement (UNFCCC, 2015) allows countries to nationally determine the type of commitment they would undertake. Countries' nationally determined contributions (NDCs) may, for example, involve economy-wide absolute targets, intensity targets, or sectoral targets. Although the Paris Agreement does not directly mention carbon markets, it includes provisions that may advance international carbon markets in a post-Kyoto climate regime. In particular, Article 6 of the Paris Agreement recognizes that countries can employ "cooperative approaches" to implement their NDCs, thereby using "internationally transferred mitigation outcomes" (ITMOs). More than half the countries plan using international market mechanisms to meet their NDCs (http://cait.wri.org/indc/). Conceivably, these mechanisms also refer to sectorfocussed approaches such as sectoral targets, i.e., the joint binding agreements between sectors and governments of countries (e.g., Baron et al., 2009; Sawa, 2010) . Some countries may employ such sectoral targets as a first step toward more ambitions economy-wide targets in the future (see e.g., Den Barrett, 2010; Böhringer et al., 2014) . Sectoral approaches may also emerge from industry initiatives, including ICAO and IMO. A first example could be the so-called Global MarketBased Measure, a carbon offsetting and reduction scheme for international aviation agreed upon by the ICAO in 2016.
Sectoral targets may lead to ITMOs further on called "emission certificates" being traded across countries, thus allowing for efficiency gains while at the same time addressing the concerns of competitiveness and carbon leakage when the stringency of climate policy differs across countries. Even before the emergence of the Paris Agreement, sectoral targets have been one proposition for future agreements on climate change, having primarily been proposed for energy-intensive sectors, such as the cement, steel, or electricity sectors, but their role may have been strengthened by the new agreement.
Quantitative analyses of sectoral targets for individual sectors are mainly based on partial equilibrium models (e.g., Mathiesen and Maestad, 2004; Meunier and Ponssard, 2012; Karali et al., 2014) but also on computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis to capture economic effects on trade and production (e.g., Voigt et al., 2011; HamdiCherif et al., 2011; Gavard et al., 2011; Mu et al., 2017) .
In this paper, we explore the impacts of emission targets in the steel sector in a general equilibrium framework, their interaction with an emissions trading system (ETS), and to which extent sector targets may address competitiveness concerns. The steel sector seems particularly suited for a sectoral targets approach for two reasons. First, steel production is relatively CO 2 -intensive, accounting for about 3-5% of the global CO 2 emissions. Secondly, the steel industry is trade-intensive, with more than a quarter of finished steel products being exported (World Steel Association, 2014) .
Steel is mainly produced via two technological routes: a basic oxygen furnace (BOF), which produces primary steel from virgin raw materials, or an electric arc furnace (EAF), which produces secondary steel from recycled metal products. Thus, BOF production is mainly associated with direct CO 2 emissions, whereas EAF causes primarily indirect CO 2 emissions via electricity use. The shares of BOF and EAF differ considerably across countries (see Table A .1).
While some engineering-economic bottom-up models distinguish between different steel production technologies, this is typically not the case for econometrically estimated (macro) economic models or for CGE models. Exceptions include Lutz et al. (2005) for macroeconometric models and Schumacher and Sands (2007) for CGE models. Since the regional scope of these models is limited to one country (Germany), they cannot adequately capture competitiveness and leakage effects.
To explore the implications of sectoral targets for the steel industry, and as the main methodological contribution of the paper, we first modify an existing dynamic CGE model to more adequately reflect steel production technologies. The model is then applied to investigate two policy scenarios which differ by the number of sectors within and across countries facing emission targets and to which extent trading of emission certificates is allowed between the target sector (steel) and sectors subject to emissions trading.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the main features of the model and includes the disaggregation of the steel sector into BOF and EAF steel. Section 3 describes the specific emission targets in each scenario. Section 4 presents the model results. The final section discusses the main findings and concludes.
Modeling

Empirical model
The analyses rely on a multi-country, multi-sector, recursive dynamic CGE model which is based on the GDyn (Ianchovichina and McDougall, 2001 ) and GTAP-E models (Burniaux and Truong, 2002; Nijkamp et al., 2005) , utilizes the GTAP 7 database, and includes domestic trade and transport margins (Peterson and Lee, 2009 ). Accordingly, households and firms are assumed to act perfectly rational but myopic. That is, they maximize utility or profits given the information available in a particular period.
1 As is typical for CGE models (e.g., Dellink et al., 2004; Babiker and Eckaus, 2007; Guivarch et al., 2011; Capros et al., 2013; Nordhaus and Sztorc, 2013) , relative factor prices drive companies' input portfolio and output prices drive demand and supply. Factor prices and output prices adjust instantaneously so that all markets clear in all time periods.
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The base year of the model is 2012. The underlying GTAP database, whose base year is 2004, is updated to 2012 using observed changes in GDP, CO 2 emissions, and population in each region in the model for the 2004-2012 period. 3 In the update simulation, we also assume that all Annex I countries meet their national targets under the Kyoto Protocol, with the exception of the United States. We also do not allow for "hot air" for Russia or the Ukraine, so no national targets are imposed for these regions in the update simulation. The model consists of 32 country/regions and has 18 industries/sectors 4 . The EU 27 has been aggregated into five countries (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, UK) and four regions according to their main steel-production routes (BOF versus other processes) and their economic development (EU15 versus EU12): BOF 15, BOF 12, REU 15, and REU 12.
5 For the remainder of this paper, we specify two groups of sectors. The ETS sector includes electricity; refined petroleum and coal; chemicals, rubber, and plastic products; other mineral products (cement); paper products; nonferrous metals as well as the BOF and EAF steel industries. Note that these industries/sectors are part of the European Union ETS. All remaining industries/sectors belong to the group of the non-ETS sector. The sub-group ETS ÀS includes all ETS sectors except for BOF and EAF steel.
Disaggregation of the steel sector
Production technologies and market shares
Primary steel is produced via sintering plants (ore concentration)/coking plants, blast furnaces (iron making), and converters (steel production). Secondary steel relies on smelted down scrap and is mostly produced via arc furnace process and to a lesser extent in induction furnaces. The main energy inputs are electricity in the EAF process and coke in the BOF process with EAF steel requiring less than half the primary energy use of BOF steel. Hence, CO 2 emissions are much lower for EAF steel than for BOF steel (ca. 0.4 t versus 1.7-1.8 t of direct CO 2 emissions per ton of crude steel, IEA, 2012). The indirect CO 2 emissions for steel production depend primarily on the carbon intensity of the power mix. In 2013, BOF steel accounted for 71.2% of global crude steel production and EAF steel for 28.2% (World Steel Association, 2014) , but shares vary significantly across regions (Table 1) . For major steel-producing countries, the share of EAF is over 60% in the USA, Mexico, India, Italy, and Spain, but less than 30% in China, Russia, the Ukraine, Japan, and Australia (World Steel Association, 2014).
Splitting EAF and BOF steel in GTAP
To allow for a more realistic modeling of steel production, the GTAP sector ferrous metals (i s) is disaggregated into BOF steel and EAF steel industries. When splitting the sector using quantity shares of BOF and EAF, we preserved the value of total steel 4 Appendix A.1 provides an overview of the production structure together with overview tables of the regions and sectors employed in the model. Appendix A.3 offers sensitivity analyses of the results to the elasticity of substitution between energy and capital, which is a key parameter in CGE-based simulations (Antimiani et al., 2015) . 5 See Table A .2 for the composition of these regions. production since the GTAP database uses values (not quantities). Thus, prices and quantities are not separately identified. This sector disaggregation mainly affects three parts of the model: inputs used in steel production, export sales, and domestic sales for intermediate use. To disaggregate input use by ferrous metals in the GTAP database into inputs used by BOF and EAF steel producers, we employ the following procedure 6 : First, total input costs are allocated to BOF and EAF steel based on the production share of BOF and EAF steel in the Steel Statistical Yearbook for the year 2004 (the base year in the GTAP data). Individual inputs are then allocated to the two processes as follows: coal, other minerals, which include metal ores, refined petroleum and coal products, which include coke, used by the ferrous metals sector are major inputs for the BOF production route and are therefore allocated to the BOF steel industry. Electricity, gas, labor, and capital are major inputs for both production routes. Therefore, we split those production factors between BOF and EAF steel based on estimated cost of each input for BOF and EAF processes in 2011 and the estimated total input cost for BOF and EAF steel production.
7 All remaining intermediate inputs are allocated on a proportional basis to ensure that the estimated total cost for each production process is met. The export sales of ferrous metal products in the GTAP database are allocated to BOF and EAF steel products using COMTRADE export data. We identified a list of four-digit HS codes that are either primarily associated with BOF steel or EAF steel products.
8 Then, the level of ferrous metal product exports in the GTAP database is disaggregated into BOF and EAF steel product exports based on the observed share of BOF steel exports between a given country bilateral pair in the COMTRADE data.
9 As a validity check, we compared the outcome with trade data provided by World Steel Association (2014), thereby assuming that flat products are mainly made from BOF steel, whereas long products are mainly made from EAF steel. The trade figures for BOF and EAF based on the World Steel Association (2014) data are quite similar to those resulting from our approach.
The domestic sales of ferrous metal products are disaggregated into sales of BOF and EAF steel products as follows. First, sales of ferrous metal products to the private and government households are allocated to BOF and EAF steel products based on the production share of BOF and EAF steel in each region. The sales of ferrous metal products for domestic intermediate use are allocated to BOF and EAF steel products on a proportional basis to ensure that the estimated total sales/cost for each process is obtained. The factor of proportionality is determined by the total sales for each process less the value of exports, sales to private and government households, and own-use intermediate input use.
We also assume that BOF and EAF steel are not substitutable. This approach reflects the (yet) rather limited substitutability of BOF and EAF steel. In practice, BOF steel is typically used for flat products, e.g., in the automobile industry. In contrast, EAF steel is typically used for long products, e.g., for the construction industry. Because of technological progress, the quality of EAF steel is expected to continue to improve, thus increasing substitutability of EAF and BOF steel. Mathiesen and Maestad (2004) , for example, employ an elasticity substitution of 0.5. Given the generally small changes in BOF and EAF steel in our analyses, the difference between using an elasticity of substitution of zero or 0.5 is rather negligible. The assumption of zero substitution between BOF and EAF is, however, in contrast to other macroeconomic analyses, for example, Lutz et al. (2005) and Schumacher and Sands (2007) which distinguish different steel production technologies in their macroeconomic models but assume crude steel from different production routes to be homogeneous products.
Scenarios
Our analysis focusses exemplarily on the year 2020. The focus of the paper is, however, on understanding the mechanisms driving the results. We define a basic forecast scenario and two policy scenarios. In the forecast scenario, the growth rates in country/region GDP, population, and CO 2 emissions are based on the current policies scenario as defined in the World Energy Outlook 2010 (IEA, 2010) . In particular, no additional climate policies are implemented in the forecast scenario. World population reaches 7.6 billion in 2020, GDP growth evolves at an average rate of 4% between 2010 and 2020, and CO 2 emissions increase by 16% to 35.2 Gt CO 2 between 2012 and 2020.
Description of policy scenarios
We implement two policy scenarios, which differ by the countries facing emission targets and by the countries and sectors allowed to trade certificates (Table 2 ). In the base scenario, all countries face two emission reduction targets for the period 2012-2020: one for all ETS sectors (i.e., also including steel) and one for non-ETS sectors. There are two four-year time periods in the model: 2013 through 2016 and 2017 through 2020. In the base scenario, trading of certificates is only allowed for the ETS sectors within the EU. This scenario serves as a reference to the policy scenario with sectoral targets.
In the sectoral target scenario, the ETS emission target is further disaggregated into two targets: one for the steel sector and one for the ETS ÀS sectors. Hence, each country faces three targets (steel, ETS ÀS , non-ETS sectors). In this scenario, trading of certificates is allowed between steel industries across all regions. In addition, because the steel sector is part of the EU ETS, trading of certificates is allowed between steel and the other ETS ÀS sectors within the EU 27.
Emission targets
The level of ambition of country targets differs across countries to reflect the principle of "common but differentiated responsibility." For Annex I countries, we assume that national CO 2 emissions in 2020 will be 30% below 1990 levels. This level is consistent with the reduction range for Annex I countries emphasized by the IPCC for meeting the 2 C target and with suggestions by the European Commission (IPCC, 2007; European Commission, 2009 ). According to , non-Annex I countries must reduce their emissions by 15-30% below baseline in 2020 so that the 2 C target may be met. We therefore set the emission targets for all non-Annex I countries to 15% below forecast levels in 2020. Hence, the stringency of climate policy differs across regions in all scenarios. Following the Effort Sharing Decision of the EU (European Commission, 2009), we assume that the ETS sectors account for 60% of the required national emission reductions between 2005 and 2020 in all countries.
Sectoral Targets to Address Competitiveness
Further, we set a sectoral target that requires the steel sector to reduce direct emissions by 10% below forecast in 2020 in all countries. 10 , 11 This target is in line with meeting the Best Available Technology for BOF and EAF steel (European Commission, 2012) . In the scenarios involving sectoral steel targets, the ETS ÀS sectors' reduction target is set such that the aggregate target of ETS ÀS and the steel sector corresponds with the ETS sectors' target in the base scenario. Table 3 displays the national emission targets for the policy scenarios together with the emissions in the forecast scenario. The targets are in line with model scenarios in the IPCC AR4 report limiting CO 2 -equivalent concentrations to low level of about 450 ppm CO 2 -eq (likely to limit global warming to 2 C above pre-industrial levels, IPCC, 2014a, b) .
12 These targets do not account for emission changes from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF), or from deforestation and degradation (REDD).
All emission reduction targets are applied equally across all time periods in the model, i.e., half the required reduction must be met in period 2013-2016 and the other half in 2017-2020. To meet national, non-ETS, or nonsteel targets, countries employ a domestic price on CO 2 emissions. Trading of credits from CDM or JI projects is not allowed in any scenario. For policy scenarios involving several targets and markets, countries may face more than one certificate price. Table 4 shows the CO 2 certificate prices for the steel sector and the ETS/ETS ÀS sectors in the different policy scenarios for major steel-producing countries and regions in 2020.
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In the base scenario, countries face a country-specific uniform certificate price for the steel sector and for ETS ÀS .
14 The differences in prices between countries reflect differences in the marginal abatement costs, reflecting that the levels of ambition of the emission targets differ significantly. They are most lenient for China and India and most ambitious for Japan and the USA.
In the sectoral targets scenario, each country also faces a price for certificates in the steel market, which is identical across all regions because these certificates can be traded globally. Certificate prices for the steel sector are lower than those in the base scenario in all countries but China and India. Certificate prices in the ETS ÀS sector are slightly lower than those in the base scenario in all countries, but they are significantly above the certificate prices for the steel sector in all countries but China and India. Source: POLES Forecast. 13 Further results, which are not reported here to save space, are available from the authors upon request. 14 The CO 2 certificate price in the EU 27 in the base scenario is substantially higher than the price currently observed in the EU ETS due to several reasons: The 2020 target implemented is substantially higher than the 2020 GHG reductions targeted at under the EU 20-20-20 policy package. In addition, our scenarios do not allow for using credits from offset projects (e.g. CDM) to reduce mitigation costs. The relatively high CO 2 certificate prices in the base scenario in many OECD countries imply that competitiveness and leakage effects are more pronounced than might be expected under known current policy scenarios.
Effects of implementing a price for CO 2 emissions for the steel sectors
Implementing emission targets involves direct and indirect certificate price effects on the production costs for BOF and EAF steel industries. The direct certificate price effect is an increase in input costs for all fossil fuel inputs. The indirect effect is an increase in the price of other intermediate inputs used by the steel sector that are fossil fuel-intensive and are also subject to a certificate price (e.g., electricity or coke). This indirect certificate price effect can be particularly large for EAF steel production in countries in which the power generation relies strongly on fossil fuels. Several other factors also affect the production of steel: (i) the "own-use effect," (ii) trade effect, (iii) changes in domestic demand, and (iv) a "general equilibrium effect." In the underlying GTAP data, steel is an important input into steel production, accounting for approximately 40% of the cost of all intermediate inputs across all regions. This likely is a reflection of the importance of "unfinished" steel in more refined steel products. Thus, an increase (decrease) in steel prices from higher (lower) fuel input prices is further magnified due to the "own-use" effect.
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Because steel is traded intensively, differences in the direct and indirect certificate price effects across countries may affect trade patterns. An extreme example is EAF steel production in Brazil and China. In Brazil, the CO 2 intensity of electricity is close to zero due to the large use of hydropower. Thus, the indirect certificate price effect for Brazilian EAF steel producers is very small. In contrast, given the large use of coalfired power plants in China, the indirect certificate price effect is much larger. In general, countries in which steel production is less CO 2 -intensive (directly and indirectly) enjoy a comparative advantage compared with countries with a high CO 2 intensity in steel production. At the same time, countries with a lower certificate price for the power sector enjoy a comparative advantage in EAF steel production compared with countries with higher certificate prices. Although trade in steel products is important, the majority of steel production is used domestically as intermediate inputs in the manufacturing and service sectors. For example, in our model, approximately one-half of BOF and EAF steel production is used domestically as an intermediate input in other manufacturing. As other manufacturing and services are part of the non-ETS sector and face emission targets in each region, differences in the certificate prices between the non-ETS and ETS sectors within a region and differences in the certificate prices for the non-ETS sector between regions will affect the competitiveness of other manufacturing sectors in each region. Since no substitution is allowed between nonenergy intermediate inputs in the model, a reduction in other manufacturing production will reduce the demand for BOF and EAF steel products.
Finally, the "general equilibrium effects" capture changes in supply and demand in response to price changes. For example, higher certificate prices result in a decrease in the total demand for carbon-intensive fossil fuels. As a result, prices for fossil fuels can decrease, offsetting part of the price increase due to the higher certificate prices. This effect is also referred to as "fossil fuel channel of carbon leakage" as a reduction in energy prices in response to a climate policy might stimulate renewed demand and thus lead to an increase in emissions (e.g., Babiker, 2005) . Finally, the implementation of climate change policies will affect the overall demand for capital and labor in each region's economy, thus altering the costs for these factors not only for the steel sectors but for all other sectors as well.
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These effects have different orders of magnitude across countries and counterbalance or amplify each other, and their combined impact may increase or offset the direct and indirect certificate price effects. Figures 1 and 2 show the combined effects of implementing the policy scenarios on the output of BOF and EAF steel production for countries and regions with a major share in world steel production.
Base scenario BOF
In the base scenario, implementing a certificate price results in a decrease in BOF steel production in most major steel-producing countries compared with the forecast. Total world production of BOF steel grows by 1.3% less than the 64.4% increase in BOF production in the forecast simulation without a certificate price. Next, we examine the mechanisms underlying this development for major steel-producing countries.
Most major BOF steel-producing countries do not export a large share of their output. In India, Japan, China, and the USA, over 90% of BOF steel production is used as an intermediate input by domestic firms, mainly in other manufacturing sectors, as own-use by the BOF steel industry and to a lesser extent by the energy-producing sectors. Thus, the decline in BOF steel production is primarily driven by the changes in production in other manufacturing as well as the own-use share of BOF steel.
In contrast, in the EU 27 and Brazil, changes in BOF steel production are driven by trade effects, as both countries are major exporters of BOF steel. In the EU 27, export of BOF steel covers nearly 30% of total production and varies significantly between countries. Approximately 70% of the EU 27 BOF steel exports is intra-EU trade. Hence, relative price changes between EU member states are the driving factors behind V. Duscha et al. changes in exports. Regions with the most energy-intensive steel production, BOF 12, Spain and Italy, experience the largest increases in the price of BOF steel and the largest reductions in exports and BOF production (Table 5) .
Similarly, effects on BOF steel production in Brazil can be understood by examining exports. Higher energy prices and significant own-use lead to a more significant increase in the price of Brazilian BOF steel by 2%, compared with global average export price increase of 1%. Therefore, BOF exports decrease. At the same time, we find that an increase in the intermediate use of BOF steel by other manufacturing sectors in Brazil partly offsets this decrease.
EAF
The impact of implementing a certificate price on the EAF steel sector is quite different from for the BOF steel sector for two reasons. First, the indirect effect of certificate prices on the price of electricity is much more important for EAF steel production than for BOF steel production. Secondly, trade effects are much more important for EAF than for BOF steel because globally, about 28% of EAF steel production is exported compared with about 15% of BOF steel production.
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Although global production of EAF steel decreases by 1.1% in the model compared to the forecast, EAF steel production increases in 18 of the 32 regions, in particular in those countries in which the EAF steel industry is not as energy-intensive and/or where the electricity sector is not as CO 2 -intensive. Different drivers determine the effects on the country level.
The relatively high energy intensity of EAF steel production in India and Russia helps explain production declines in those countries. The high energy intensity leads to a comparatively high price increase of EAF steel in India and Russia (by 3.6% and 6.2%, respectively, compared to the global average increase of 3.1%, see Table 5 ). Thus, EAF steel exports decrease for both countries, with a much larger decrease for Russia given the much larger relative price increase. In contrast, price increases for EAF steel in the UK and REU 15 are lower than the average because these countries have relatively energy-efficient EAF steel production.
The USA and Japan also experience relatively large price increases for EAF steel, 4.5% and 4.9%, respectively, leading to a decline in EAF exports in those two countries. However, while in the USA and Japan, EAF steel is relatively energyefficient, both regions see larger increases in the price of electricity than the global average: 33.2% for the USA and 13.6% for Japan compared with the average global increase of 13.5%. The large increase in the USA electricity price is due to a higher ETS certificate price as well as the USA electricity sector being relatively more reliant on coal than other regions in the model. Low carbon intensity in electricity generation is driving results in Brazil, France, and the BOF 15. The use of hydropower (Brazil), nuclear (France), and natural gas (BOF 15) results in a lower increase of the electricity price in those countries. Therefore, EAF exports grow in these regions.
For China, we find an increase in EAF steel exports despite electricity production being relatively coal-intensive. The lower ETS certificate price in China limits the increase in the price of electricity to 10.7%, which is a smaller increase than in other major EAF-producing regions.
Sectoral targets
In the sectoral targets scenario, the steel industries are separated from the other ETS industries and given their own emission reduction targets. With certificates for the steel sector traded globally, there is a single certificate price for all steel producers. In contrast, in the base scenario, the certificate price faced by steel producers varied across regions. As shown in Table 4 , the certificate prices for steel producers are lower in this scenario compared with the base scenario, except for China and India. The overall change in global BOF and EAF steel production in this scenario is similar to base scenario. However, as we will discuss next, there are significant changes in the composition of global steel production across regions (Table 6 ). Most of the effects can be ascribed to the changes in CO 2 prices experienced at the country level.
BOF
Because of the higher certificate prices in China and India, the price of BOF steel produced in China and India increases by about 0.4% and 0.6% points more than in the base scenario. In contrast, the increase in the world export price compared to the forecast is lower than that in the base scenario. Thus, producers in both regions lose export competitiveness in this scenario. The loss of exports, which is amplified by significant own-use, results in 0.5% and 1.0% point larger decreases in BOF steel production in China and India compared with the base scenario.
In the other major BOF steel-producing regions, the certificate price is substantially lower compared with the base scenario. In Brazil and Japan, this reduces the negative effects on export competitiveness found in the base scenario. Reductions in BOF steel production are lower than those in the base scenario. A similar, but more pronounced effect can be found in Russia, where the change in certificate prices is significant. It falls from $38/t to $15/t, compared to the base scenario. In combination with lower energy prices due to lower global demand for fossil fuels, the price of Russian BOF steel now decreases slightly even below the forecast. That enhances Russia's export competitiveness and results in an overall increase in Russian BOF steel production compared also with the forecast. Also for the EU 27, the certificate prices for BOF steel producers are lower compared with the base scenario, leading to smaller price increases. Effects on aggregate BOF steel production are minor and result in a slightly higher production compared with the base scenario, yet still negative compared with the forecast. As a uniform ETS price is applied in the EU 27 in both scenarios, the base scenario and the sectoral targets scenario, effects in the EU 27 are determined by the energy intensity of the production process in the individual countries and regions. Accordingly, countries with the highest energy intensity in production benefit the most: Italy, Spain, and BOF 12. For the other EU 27 regions with less energy-intensive BOF production, smaller price changes relative to the energy-intensive regions imply either a smaller gain or a larger reduction in exports, e.g., gains in BOF exports and production in the UK and the BOF 15 drop significantly.
EAF EAF steel production has lower direct CO 2 emissions than BOF steel production; yet the relative changes in certificate prices still have significant effects on EAF steel production across regions. Lower certificate prices faced by most steel producers in this scenario lead to lower input costs and price increases. The aggregate world price of EAF steel increases by only 2.5%, compared with a 3.1% increase in the base scenario.
As seen for BOF steel, China and India are two exceptions, in which the certificate price is higher in this scenario than in the base scenario ($15/t versus $11/t). However, the price for electricity in both regions is lower compared with the base scenario due to the certificate price for the ETS ÀS sectors in both regions decreasing slightly. The lower electricity price offsets the higher certificate price, resulting in similar price increases for EAF steel in China and India as in the base scenario. However, as the world price of EAF steel increases by 0.6% points less than in the base scenario, Chinese and Indian EAF steel producers lose competitiveness. EAF exports from China and India both decline by 3.2% and 3.0% points, respectively, compared with the base scenario. In addition, Chinese EAF exports and production switch from increasing in the base scenario to decreasing in this scenario.
In other major EAF-producing regions, the relatively large reduction in the certificate prices leads to smaller price increases. In Russia, the USA, Brazil, and Japan, the price increases are lower than those in the base scenario. As the aggregate global price of EAF steel decreases less than EAF prices in these regions, they either experience lower reductions in exports (Russia, USA, and Japan) or an increase in exports (Brazil). Hence, the introduction of sectoral targets leads to a lower reduction in EAF steel production in Russia, the USA, and Japan and to an increase in EAF steel production in Brazil.
In the EU 27 regions -as in the case of BOF steel -the impact of introducing steel sector targets is the greatest for the regions with the most energy-intensive EAF production (Germany, Italy, the BOF 15, and the BOF 12). They benefit the most from the lower certificate price compared with the base scenario. Total EAF steel production in the EU 27 declines by 1.5% in this scenario compared with 1.8% in the base scenario. Table 7 shows the amount of certificates traded on the steel market in the sectoral targets scenario. Overall, trade of CO 2 certificates is minor. Major sellers are China and India, which have a large reduction potential in BOF steel production, as well as the USA. The sale of emission certificates is not only caused by a significant decrease in CO 2 intensity of the production process, but also by a decrease in production. The sectoral targets allow Russia to increase BOF production by purchasing certificates from the steel sectors abroad.
Certificate trading
Measuring changes in competitiveness effects of sectoral approaches
To capture the extent to which sectoral approaches are able to countervail the negative effects of country differences in the stringency of climate policy on steel market output, we calculate the changes in a country's global output shares for the three policy scenarios compared with the forecast in 2020 for both BOF and EAF (Table 8) .
BOF
For BOF steel production, China, India, and Russia gain market share between 2012 and 2020 in the forecast. Until 2020, China increases its market share by 12%, covering about 49% of global BOF steel production. India and Russia increase their share by 1%, accounting for about 5% and 6% of global production, respectively. The largest declines in market share occur in the USA and the EU 27, who both lose around 2% covering about 5% and 14% of global production in 2020.
In the base scenario, China gains slightly more market share in 2020, compared with the forecast market share, whereas Japan and the EU 27 lose additional market share to a small extent. Interestingly, India loses market share compared with the forecast. Most other differences in market share between the forecast and the base scenario are small. Introducing sectoral targets reduces the extent of the changes in market share in the base scenario for most countries. This is not true for Russia, who can further increase its market share compared with the base scenario as well as for India and the USA, who lose slightly more market share in the sectoral targets scenario. For the countries with the highest certificate prices in the base scenario, i.e., Japan, USA, and EU 27, the base scenario results in a combined global BOF market share loss of 0.0031. In sectoral targets, this loss amounts to 0.0025. Hence, for these countries, sectoral targets makes up for about 20% of the loss in global BOF market share in the base scenario. EAF For EAF steel production, again China has the largest market share in 2020 with an increase of 10% between 2012 and 2020. In addition, India experiences increases in market share between 2012 and 2020 in the forecast, whereas Japan, the USA, and to a lesser extent also the EU 27 face the largest decreases. The impacts of the policy scenarios for China and India are the same as they were for BOF steel. China increases market share in 2020, compared with the forecast, in the base and sectoral targets scenarios. India loses market share across both policy scenarios, compared with the forecast. Qualitatively, for Japan, the USA, Brazil, and the EU 27, the policy scenarios have the same impacts for EAF as for BOF steel.
For the countries with the highest certificate prices in the base scenario, i.e., Japan, USA, and EU 27, the combined global EAF market share loss in the base scenario is 0.0053, and 0.0042 in sectoral targets. Thus, sectoral targets makes up for about 20% of the loss in global EAF market share in the base scenario.
Conclusions and Policy Implications
Relying on a multi-country, multi-sector recursive dynamic CGE model, we focus on the competitiveness effects of sectoral targets for the steel sector in international climate policy and their interaction with ETS. To better reflect technological realities and to account for different energy and carbon intensities of production, the sector ferrous metals is disaggregated into two industries, i.e., primary fossil fuel-based steel production (BOF) and secondary scrap recycling steel production (EAF) which is mainly based on electricity use.
Our policy simulations suggest that sectoral targets may effectively counter the (negative) output effects of differences in the stringency of climate policy across countries. The findings differ, however, by country and steel production technology. In comparison to the base scenario, allowing for global trading on the steel market in the sectoral targets scenario improves the competitiveness of steel production in Annex I countries with stringent targets and relatively high marginal mitigation costs. For these countries, certificate prices for steel are lower in the sectoral targets scenario so that production costs are lower, export competitiveness improves, and output is higher than that in the base scenario.
Sectoral Targets to Address Competitiveness
In comparison to other countries, India and China are negatively affected by sectoral targets because of direct and indirect cost effects. Higher certificate prices both for the steel and the ETS ÀS sectors compared with the base scenario result in a loss of export competitiveness and decreased production in both countries.
Global effects are more ambiguous as China and India hold large shares of global production, and their losses are not fully offset by increases from other major producers. The loss in global BOF production is slightly lower in the sectoral targets scenario compared with the base scenario. The effect on global EAF production is negative in the sectoral targets scenarios. In the sectoral targets scenario, BOF accounts for about 90% of the emission reductions in the steel sector.
The results of the policy simulations further suggest that splitting the steel sector into its major processes allows for additional insights into inter-industry effects. For most countries, the relative magnitude of the output effects for BOF and EAF differs noticeably in all policy simulations. Moreover, the outputs' effect of BOF and EAF tends to be of opposite directions.
Last but not the least, our policy simulations suggest that sectoral targets may effectively counter the (negative) effects of climate policy involving differences in stringency across countries on global steel market shares, in particular for EAF. For the countries with the highest certificate prices in the base scenario, i.e., Japan, USA, and EU 27, a sectoral targets approach would reduce about 20% of the loss in their global BOF and EAF market shares in the base scenario.
Appendix A
A.1. Production structure in GTAP-E In the GTAP-E production structure (Fig. A.1 ), firms cannot substitute among nonenergy intermediate inputs or between nonenergy intermediates and a primary factor composite. The primary factor composite includes land, skilled and unskilled labor, natural resources, and a capital-energy composite with a constant elasticity of substitution between them. Within the capital-energy composite, firms may substitute between an energy composite and capital. There are three inter-fuel substitution possibilities: (a) electricity and the nonelectricity composite; (b) coal and the noncoal composite; and (c) between oil, gas, and petroleum products. A key model parameter is the elasticity of substitution between capital and the energy composite, KE , which we set equal to 1.0. At this level, capital and energy are substitutes in all industries.
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Appendix A.3 provides results of sensitivity analyses with respect to KE .
As is standard in multi-county CGE models (e.g., Capros et al., 2013) , demand for each final and intermediate good is split optimally between domestically produced and imported goods, following the "Armington" assumption. That is, domestic and imported goods are considered to be imperfect substitutes.
The periods are linked via investment decisions of the representative regional household, who holds a mix of domestic and "foreign" financial assets, backed by the physical capital owned by domestic or foreign firms. Households invest their savings using a lagged adjustment, adaptive expectations theory of investment in which any disparities in expected rates of return across regions are not eliminated instantaneously, but progressively through time by reallocation of capital from regions with lower Sectoral Targets to Address Competitiveness expected rates of return to regions with higher expected rates of return (Ianchovichina and Walmsley, 2012) .
A.2. Exemplary disaggregation of input costs of the steel sector
The following table shows the calculation of the disaggregation of the steel sector into BOF and EAF steel exemplarily for Australia.
A.3. Sensitivity of results to elasticity of substitution between energy and capital
In assessing the impact of emission reductions on economic activity, one key model parameter is the elasticity of substitution between energy and capital, KE . The easier it is for industries to substitution away from energy inputs as their relative prices increase due to climate policies, the smaller the impact will be of those climate policies. However, empirical estimates of KE are available only for broadly defined sectors and with limited evidence on how they may vary across countries (Antimiani et al., 2015) .
In our base set of parameters, we assume a larger value of KE equal to 1.0, twice the standard values in the GTAP database because we utilize 4-year time periods in our Antimiani et al. (2015) . These latter values of KE range from 0.13 for wood products to 0.45 for food, with a value of 0.24 for basic metals. As shown in Table A .4, reductions in the value of KE can have substantial impacts on the certificate prices of CO 2 in the ETS sector, similar to the findings of Antimiani et al. (2015) . For regions such as China and India, which are relatively more energyintensive and have lower emission targets, the absolute increase in the certificate price is much smaller, reflecting a lower marginal cost of abatement. For regions such as the USA and Japan with larger emission targets and are relatively less energy-intensive, the marginal cost of abatement becomes much higher with a lower value of KE . Across the different scenarios, as the values of KE decrease, the levels of the certificate prices increase. Although not shown in Table A .4, reductions in KE have much smaller impacts on the certificate prices in the non-ETS sector in all regions.
Because steel is used mainly as an intermediate input, global production is closely tied to changes in global economic activity. Higher certificate prices in the ETS sectors, due to lower values of KE , should have an adverse impact on global GDP and therefore on global steel production. In the base and sector targets scenarios, using our base parameters, global GDP decreases by 0.9% compared with the forecast level of global GDP in 2020 or approximately $660 billion. Decreasing the value of KE by one-half would cause a 0.2% point decrease in global GDP (from À0.9% to À1.1%) or an additional $140 billion reduction. Using the still lower values in Case C results in an additional 0.1% point decrease (to À1.2%), or $60 billion, in global GDP. As shown in Table A .5, these relatively small reductions in GDP result in slightly larger decreases in steel production, with the larger reductions occurring for BOF steel. The higher certificate prices also lead to larger price increases, compared with the base model parameters. Table 1 in Antimiani et al. (2015) . Table A .6 shows how changes in the values of KE affect the changes in BOF and EAF production across regions. For the most regions, the value of KE does not affect the direction of the change in production, although the magnitudes do vary somewhat. There are three exceptions to this general observation. First, in the base scenario, the change BOF steel production in Russia compared with the forecast changes sign from a reduction when using the base parameters, to a small increase when using smaller Table 1 in Antimiani et al. (2015) . values of KE . This occurs because certificate prices in Russia increase relatively less (on a percentage basis) than other steel-producing regions, leading to larger exports of BOF steel from Russia. Secondly, USA production of BOF and EAF steel in the sector targets scenario changes from a decrease relative to the forecast when using the base parameters to a small increase relative to the forecast when using the parameters in Case C. This occurs because of significantly larger increases in BOF and EAF steel exports to Canada. The growth in the demand for steel in Canada is large enough; even with the purchases of steel emission certificates, steel imports to Canada must increase to meet its demand. The USA is the largest exporter of both BOF and EAF steel to Canada. Finally, change in EAF steel production in China switches from a reduction relative to the forecast to an increase relative to the forecast in Case C of the sector targets scenario. A smaller KE leads to larger electricity price increases in many regions. However, the price increase is smaller for China because of the lower emission targets. As electricity is a key input in the production of EAF steel, a relatively smaller increase in the price of electricity improves China's competitive position, leading to higher exports.
